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World War I, it can also be argued that even be-
fore the 1918 armistice, droughts and their relat-
ed effects had a mixed effect on cattle prices. The 
droughts that struck the Texas Panhandle were 
nothing new, but they increased dependence 
on cottonseed cake, the prices of which signifi-
cantly increased. In response, cattle consumed 
loco weed, the effects of which were not unlike 
toxic milkweed. However, some cattle sales con-
tinued uninterrupted. In the following years, the 
droughts had major consequences in the context 
of smaller-scale ranch development and of World 
War I. In this essay I present a short history of 
the JA Ranch prior to 1915 and then examine 
the 1915–16 and 1917 droughts and their effects 
on cattle sales, including the droughts’ effects on 
land sales. Finally, I explain this story’s connec-
tion to the larger historiographical context of the 
Great Plains.
TEXAS RANCHES
This was not T. D. Hobart’s first time to remedy 
problems with a Texas Panhandle ranch. In fact, 
some thirty years earlier, the Francklyn Land and 
Cattle Company and its Diamond F Ranch faced 
Timothy Dwight Hobart, general manager of 
the JA Ranch in northwestern Texas, had a prob-
lem on his hands. Trying to sell his cattle in 1918, 
he had helped transport hundreds of head of cat-
tle within the ranch. However, J. W. Kent, who 
was with the JA Ranch for a substantial portion 
of its history to date, noticed that the cattle were 
not feeling well. Anthrax had poisoned the cattle, 
and it was spreading quickly. “We are burning 
the carcasses,” Hobart wrote, “and not leaving a 
stone unturned to stamp out the disease.” What 
was he to do? 1
In this study I discuss and analyze correspon-
dence from the JA Ranch in a larger context, 
especially concerning drought and its effects on 
cattle and some land sales. Although many his-
torians believe cattle sales plummeted only after 
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foreclosure due to overspending. Located in Rob-
erts, Gray, Carson, and Hutchinson Counties in 
northwestern Texas, the ranch had been founded 
in 1882 when Colonel B. B. Groom and his son, 
H. T. (Harry), came to the Texas Panhandle from 
Kentucky. B. B. Groom was the ranch’s first man-
ager, and the ranch’s financiers were located at 
44 Wall Street in New York City. But like many 
other Texas Panhandle ranches, the Diamond F 
struggled with the vice of extravagant spending. 
The ranch was almost bankrupt by 1886. But 
after the company’s bondholders won a lawsuit 
against its president, Charles G. Francklyn, the 
company resurfaced as the White Deer Lands 
Company. Hobart, then thirty-one years of age, 
now oversaw land deals. The company would op-
erate in some capacity until its 1957 liquidation.2
Coping with drought had always been part of 
the western cattle-ranching movement, which had 
reached the Texas Panhandle by 1915. Scholar-
ship on this movement has been rich. Atherton’s 
influential study, simply titled The Cattle Kings, 
eschews the role of the cowboy as a primary actor 
in western history, instead promoting the role of 
ranchers in the creation of the West. Rather than 
promoting the role of the South, Atherton em-
phasizes British and American investment as hav-
ing been essential for the creation of the Ameri-
can West. This case study follows Atherton’s 
approach but expands his treatment of drought 
beyond the well-known 1886–87 drought. Jordan 
stresses the role of individuals in his book Trails 
to Texas: Southern Roots of Western Cattle Ranch-
ing and analyzes a cross-section of Texas regions, 
promoting the role of the American South in the 
establishment of Texas ranching. Relevant to the 
JA Ranch’s story is Jordan’s summary of Charles 
Goodnight, which follows Haley’s Charles Good-
night: Cowman and Plainsman.3 Mary Sandoz, 
in The Cattlemen: From the Rio Grande across the 
Far Marias, argues that western ranching had a 
“romantic” component to it. She devotes some 
space to the Big Die-Up of 1886–87, and she also 
briefly mentions the agricultural boom of the 
1910s in passing.4 Robert C. Athearn’s book High 
Country Empire: The High Plains and Rockies exam-
ines the Eastern Seaboard’s influence on western 
expansion, including on western ranching.5 Gene 
M. Gressley’s work Bankers and Cattlemen exam-
ines the 1886–87 drought in detail but, as with 
several previous studies, does not pay sufficient 
attention to the 1910s.6 J. Orin Oliphant’s On 
the Cattle Ranges of the Oregon Country does not 
examine any drought, but it does mention the 
“‘Texas’ or Spanish fever . . . epidemic . . . [d]ur-
ing the late 1860s.”7 The Big Die-Up also hurt the 
Swan Land and Cattle Company, who operated 
a ranch in Wyoming through the first quarter of 
the twentieth century.8 It also hurt the Circle C 
Ranch in Montana.9 Missing from this body of 
work is a discussion on other ranches, especially 
during the 1890s or 1910s.
The Diamond F and the JA Ranches were 
part of a larger effort by Britain and the eastern 
United States to invest in large-scale ranching in 
Texas, including in the Panhandle. Northwestern 
Texas had only been open for Anglo settlement 
since the United States’ victory over the Plains 
Indian tribes in the 1874–75 Red River War. 
Ranches had varying financial success. Perhaps 
the most successful was the Matador Ranch, lo-
cated in Motley County northeast of present-day 
Lubbock. Henry “Hank” Campbell established 
the Matador in 1879 with financial backing from 
A. M. Britton. With operational headquarters 
located in Denver, then Fort Worth, the Scottish-
funded ranch would operate until its cessation 
in 1951.10 Britton also funded the Spur Ranch, 
another British-owned ranch located in Crosby, 
Dickens, Garza, and Kent Counties east of Lub-
bock. The Espuela Cattle Company was founded 
in 1882 when J. M. Hall turned his cattle over to 
an investment group. Much like the Matador, the 
Espuela ranch’s operational headquarters moved 
to Fort Worth and was funded by British inves-
tors. Instead of Dundee, Scotland, however, these 
investors were in London. The ranch would op-
erate through the 1920s agricultural depression 
before ceasing operations in 1930.11 The storied 
XIT Ranch was not as successful as its founders 
had expected. Established in 1882 as tender for a 
new Texas State Capitol building in Austin, the 
Capitol Syndicate of Chicago operated the ranch 
with financial backing from London’s Capitol 
Freehold Land and Investment Company. The 
ranch narrowly inverted insolvency when George 
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Findlay, a Scot, took control of the XIT in 1887, 
only two years into its operations. Although Find-
lay returned the ranch to better financial straits, a 
series of 1901 lawsuits brought by minority inves-
tors would hurt its operations. After seven years 
of land sales, the ranch closed in 1912.12
The Paloduro or JA Ranch, as mentioned ear-
lier, fared better. Charles Goodnight, a Central 
Texas cattleman who had lost his entire fortune 
in the Panic of 1873, settled in the Palo Duro 
Canyon south of Amarillo in 1876. Goodnight 
wanted to try his hand at ranching once again, 
but he needed money to do so. John Adair, an 
investor from Rathdare, Ireland, agreed to fi-
nance the ranch’s operations and would own 
two-thirds of the shares of the ranch. Goodnight, 
meanwhile, owned one-third of these shares and 
managed the ranch, which the two men founded 
in 1877. Over the next decade, Goodnight would 
expand the size of the ranch through a series of 
land purchases, and the JA would lie in seven 
different northwestern Texas counties.13 But af-
ter encountering the brutal weather of 1886–87, 
and after John Adair’s death in 1885, Goodnight 
sold his one-third interest to Adair’s widow, a 
New Yorker named Cornelia Wadsworth Ritchie 
Adair. After Goodnight resigned his manage-
ment position, several successors followed, with 
only Richard Walsh serving longer than five 
years. Walsh managed the JA Ranch from 1892 
until he left the United States for South Africa 
in 1910. Meanwhile, Hobart, who for some years 
after the Diamond F foreclosure was a land agent 
for the New York and Texas Company, a division 
of the Francklyn Land and Cattle Company, re-
signed that post in 1915 to become the ranch’s 
latest general manager. By the time he died in 
1935, Hobart had become the ranch’s longest-
serving manager.14
DROUGHT IN NORTHWESTERN TEXAS
Even the most financially viable ranches faced the 
difficulty of droughts. The Big Die-Up of 1886–
87, which included a blistering summer drought 
and then a brutally cold and wet winter, killed 
many of the cattle on these ranches. Texas Pan-
handle historians refer to the 1886–87 climactic 
events as a watershed event in that region’s his-
tory, primarily because it was the first such event 
since Anglo settlement. Of course, these events 
were really not that unusual. Because of the area’s 
legendary semiarid climate and high elevations, 
extremes in weather happen with relative regular-
ity. But for farmers and ranchers, these weather 
events can cause a great deal of frustration. For 
settlers taking advantage of the Land Law of 
1887 and the Four Section Act of 1895, which 
opened the Texas rangelands to settlement, these 
events shocked them. Many settlers were not ac-
customed to such dramatic and sudden changes 
in weather. As we will see, the 1886–87 weather 
events were not the last to occur on the corporate 
ranches.
Droughts in northwestern Texas were noth-
ing extraordinary. In fact, they were part of the 
cyclical weather patterns that have dominated 
the region’s culture for centuries. Often, these 
droughts included several components. First, 
that was traditionally low almost disappeared 
with the help of dry winds from Mexico. Many 
days passed with humidity values from 5 to 20 
percent. Second, with these low humidity values 
and hot winds came a lack of precipitation of 
any type. Weeks transpired without any rainfall 
or snowfall, depending on the season. Third, be-
cause of this lack of precipitation, temperatures 
rose above normal for the time of year. Spring 
and summer temperatures often exceeded one 
hundred degrees Fahrenheit. Of course, tem-
peratures cooled quickly after dark. Fourth, grass 
died, and cattle were without their regular feed. 
Instead, the cattle ate other plants, such as cot-
tonseed cake and, more troubling, locoweed. 
Fifth, dead grass often led to range fires, not un-
like the fires that burned parts of this region from 
2010 to the present.
Several factors exacerbated droughts in north-
western Texas. First, the area’s already short grass 
layered the landscape even more thinly than under 
high precipitation. This layering is unlike the lush 
grass in more humid climates such as the Ameri-
can South, even when droughts occurred there as 
well. When the first cowmen began their ranches 
on the Texas Plains, cattle grazed—overgrazed, 
even—the grass to nothing. As I will show, among 
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the consequences of such overgrazing are cattle 
diseases. Second, new settlement destroyed grazing 
lands that would otherwise have seemed endless 
for cattle. The Land Law of 1887 and the Four Sec-
tion Act of 1895 hurt matters for cattle ranchers—
in addition to the reasons mentioned below—on 
the grounds that new towns were subtracting the 
available grazing land from these ranches. Third, 
these ranches evidently knew nothing of crop rota-
tion practices used by farmers. The JA Ranch, to 
say nothing of other ranches in the West, also grew 
alfalfa and some food commodities to supplement 
their revenues. Unrotated land, in addition to ex-
cessive grazing, eroded the grasses. Droughts stunt-
ed ranching, and the 1915–16 and 1917 droughts 
were two case studies.
The JA Ranch endured a blistering drought 
during T. D. Hobart’s first year as general man-
ager. One of Hobart’s letters to Cornelia Adair 
from June 1916 paints a somewhat brighter pic-
ture of ranch conditions. Despite lower-than-
normal rainfall in a few places, ranch conditions 
seemed to be fine.15 But during the summer of 
1916, the drought conditions continued. Hobart 
assured Adair that despite the oppressive heat 
and drought, her current cows were unaffected. 
However, her younger cows were not well. Hobart 
reminded Adair that there was no cause for pan-
ic, but there would be if the drought continued.16 
Later in July, Hobart and longtime JA employee J. 
W. Kent checked on the cattle, which seemed to 
be staying close to the water. Obviously, with the 
dry heat and lack of rainfall, this was a difficult 
task.17 But relief was coming. Around September 
1, 1916, “another good rain,” as Hobart put it, 
fell on the JA Ranch. Perhaps the drought was 
easing up.18 This rain followed a “general rain,” 
albeit not enough of one to eradicate the effects 
of the drought. “I hope,” Hobart added, “there 
will be sufficient [rain] to enable us to sow the 
alfalfa.” The JA Ranch had experimented with al-
falfa farming during these years.19 The drought, or 
this leg of it, finally ended on or around Septem-
ber 11, 1916. That day, Hobart wrote that heavy 
rain, perhaps enough to cause some flooding, fell 
across the JA, including Palo Duro Canyon. “The 
outlook is now much brighter,” Hobart added.20 
It certainly was—for the time being.
But less than one year later, the JA Ranch suf-
fered through yet another drought. As Hobart 
wrote Cornelia Adair on or around June 13, 1917, 
“We are passing through one of the most severe 
droughts that has ever occurred in this country 
at this section of the year, so far as [Hobart had] 
known.” The drought would kill a good number 
of the crops. The only good news, Hobart noted, 
was that “[t]he windmill men have found it ex-
tremely difficult to keep up their work using the 
mill team, and as we had a chance to trade for a 
Ford combination truck with the capacity of one 
ton, turning in the light pair of mules and pay-
ing $600 difference, both Mr. Kent and myself 
considered it wise to do so.” He continued, “This 
will enable the men to make at least double time 
in going from one mill to another, to say nothing 
about the usefulness of the truck in other ways.” 
Hobart had ordered some of his employees to sell 
some of the animal labor on the JA Ranch to buy 
a new automobile. Hobart needed to complete 
this task before drought conditions worsened. 
Some hope remained that this drought would be 
shorter in duration and milder in intensity than 
previous occurrences.21
Cottonseed cake prices increased during 
droughts, straining ranch budgets. For the JA 
Ranch, the 1915–16 drought meant that cotton-
seed cake was needed to feed the cattle. When 
grass died from a lack of rainfall—the rainfall that 
it needed to remain hydrated—cattle often went 
hungry. Cattle did not have their normal means 
of survival, and cattle ranchers needed other 
methods to feed their herds. If grass died, then 
cottonseed cake was a viable alternative. And the 
Texas Panhandle–Southern Plains region was very 
hospitable to cottonseed production, especially 
around Lubbock, a modest distance away from 
the JA lands. During this time, the JA Ranch may 
have been growing this cake on its plains sections, 
more so than on the Palo Duro Canyon lands. 
These price increases presented a problem for 
Hobart, when he arrived at the JA Ranch in 1915 
during a drought. Hobart needed to find anoth-
er method of feeding these cattle—and quickly. 
From what we know of his correspondence with 
Cornelia Adair, Hobart most likely turned to 
cottonseed cake sometime in the second half of 
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1915. Although this cake was “money well spent,” 
prices continued to increase. As 1916 passed, 
these price increases, coupled with the contin-
ued drought, began to take its toll on Hobart. 
In a postscript to a letter, Hobart reported that 
“[o]il cake is simply soaring—$45 per ton now. 
Fortunately we bought 100 tons at $34.40 and 
100 tons more at an advance, but not nearly what 
it is worth now.”22 These price increases probably 
cut into the revenues generated from land sales 
under the aforementioned 1887 and 1895 laws. 
What was a ranch manager to do when his cat-
tle’s main source of nourishment had dried up, 
especially when the alternate source increased in 
price? What could the cattle do?
LOCOWEED AND BLACKLEG
One troubling answer to these questions lay in 
locoweed. With effects not unlike that of milk-
weed, and similar to other types of poisonings, 
cattle that ate this weed suffered digestive prob-
lems. If nothing else, locoweed could kill cattle 
as effectively, if not more effectively, than starva-
tion. A head of cattle with digestive problems was 
unattractive to potential buyers looking to feed 
their families. If a cow could avoid it, whether by 
training, by discipline, or by some other means, 
and if weather conditions were better, locoweed 
would not be an impediment to cattle ranching. 
But for some of the JA cows, it was. In a 1916 
letter, Hobart documented one good example 
of this problem. Describing a host of ranch ac-
tivities as he did in many of these letters, Hobart 
wrote that “loco” was the only real problem on 
the ranch, noting that “[q]uite a number of cows 
have taken to eating it,” and that the cows were 
“put on feed.”23 Although Hobart does not de-
scribe exactly what digestive problems these cattle 
encountered, the problems were likely similar to 
a typical stomach virus, only with more serious, if 
not fatal, risks.
Then there was the blackleg virus, which in-
fected many a head of JA cattle around this time. 
Clostridium chauvoei is a bacterium that breeds on 
overgrazed grass. The droughts that struck the JA 
Ranch during this time certainly gave these bacte-
ria a fertile breeding ground. The unusually short 
grass, even for the Texas Panhandle, was grazed to 
nothing. When a head of cattle became infected 
with blackleg, it first encountered symptoms simi-
lar to the human influenza virus—unable to eat, 
unable to do normal activities, respiratory prob-
lems, higher-than-normal body temperatures, 
and swollen joints and cavities. Often, cattle 
died within two days of infection.24 Hobart knew 
he needed to come up with a quick solution to 
this problem. Time was running short to save 
his cattle. If his cattle died, the JA Ranch would 
lose profits. Even if the cattle survived their ail-
ments, they were unfit for sale at market. This 
issue weighed heavily on Hobart in his first few 
years as the JA’s general manager.
Hobart worked to try to solve the issue. In 
1917 he received word that the Kansas State Agri-
cultural College had developed a vaccine to com-
bat blackleg. Hobart expressed relief as he wrote 
to his superior on or around March 22, 1917. 
Save for an unrelated “J.J.” cattle death, the vac-
cine seemed to be working. “Mr. Kent and I think 
that it would be wise to use the Kansas vaccine 
on all your calves another year,” Hobart wrote. 
“I know of a number of people who have used 
it with very satisfactory results.” Despite more 
deaths from Adair’s “main herd,” the vaccine 
apparently succeeded. Hobart and many other 
ranchers liked what they saw with this “Kansas 
vaccine.”25 Trying to transport cattle to market 
was also tedious, as Hobart would describe some 
months later. “We are having great difficulty,” 
Hobart wrote, “in securing cars for the delivery 
of cattle. Some of the calves are dying with black-
leg, and I have ordered vaccine from the Kansas 
Agricultural College, and am expecting it to-day.” 
He continued, “Mr. [H. W.] Skinner, who is to 
receive the calves, will pay for the vaccine, and 
will send his veterinary here to do the work. I 
am to take him to Ashtola to-morrow.”26 For the 
remainder of 1917 and for the early months of 
1918, disaster might have been averted.
But this was not so. In June 1918, as the Unit-
ed States helped her allies turn back the enemy 
forces in World War I, the blackleg crisis once 
again emerged on the JA Ranch. An alarmed 
Hobart notified Cornelia Adair of the news. 
“In the south end of the range,” Hobart wrote, 
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“a number of young fat cows have died from 
some unknown cause.” Although locoweed was 
originally blamed, blackleg had killed them. This 
came from a consultation with “Professor Goss 
of the Kansas Agricultural College.” Hobart then 
added that “we have decided to vaccinate all the 
dry cows in the Cherokee pasture a little later.” A 
problem that had seemingly ended instead wors-
ened.27 And it continued to worsen during the 
summer of 1918. Hobart wrote Adair that “a little 
over one hundred head have died from this cause 
[blackleg] since early last fall.” Hobart repeated 
the news from Goss. He then “propose[d] to se-
cure a portion of the affected parts of one of the 
animals, and send it to Dr. Goss for analysis.” He 
then added, “I think this will be much more sat-
isfactory than bringing a veterinary to the ranch.” 
Surely this problem could only get better.28
Cornelia Adair had an idea: hold a contest 
to see which pasture would lose the fewest cows 
to blackleg, locoweed, or other cause. She wrote 
to Hobart in October 1918 from a residence in 
Bath, England:
I perfectly agree with what you say about the 
counting of the cattle, in fact I think they 
ought to be tallied every second year, and I 
think they certainly ought to be done next 
year. It seems to me that the losses have been 
very small these last two years compared with 
what they used to be, don’t you think so? I 
hoped that the small pastures would institute 
a sort of competition among the camps to 
see who could have the fewest losses. Do you 
think it would be a good plan to offer a prize 
in money for that purchase?
Even though the JA Ranch had endured black-
leg and drought, it had evidently lost fewer cattle 
than under previous management, even under 
the legendary Charles Goodnight.29 Although he 
remained silent on this issue for several months, 
Hobart had a different opinion. He finally re-
vealed it. Responding in February 1919, he wrote 
that the contest “would not be best as conditions 
vary considerably in the different pastures.” In 
other words, Adair’s idea was, at best, idealistic, 
and, at worst, myopic.30
Meanwhile, in November 1918, the blackleg 
problem showed signs of improvement. Adair 
responded that because the problems with cattle 
disease had slowed, Hobart should “kindly write 
me a little memorandum and send it to me upon 
this outbreak of disease.” Adair wanted to know 
what to do should these problems reappear. 
Adair then reminisced on a similar outbreak in 
1910. Adair repudiated the notion that it was 
“contagious pneumonia.”31 As Hobart sent the 
memorandum, the JA Ranch would still struggle 
with this problem for the remainder of Adair and 
Hobart’s leadership.
CATTLE AND LAND SALES
Droughts and blackleg had a mixed effect on 
cattle sales during Hobart’s first years on the JA 
Ranch. In some cases, he experienced difficulty 
in selling cattle. When this occurred, as Adair 
explained her previous protocol, “losses must be 
counted and not so much per cent written off.” 
She added, “That [method] was a very unsatisfac-
tory way of doing things, but when the pastures 
were so enormous there was nothing else for it.”32 
And count the losses Hobart did. Many of the 
JA’s cattle died either from a lack of water, a bout 
with blackleg, or some other cause. Hobart knew 
that cattle sales were going to be difficult to ex-
ecute. He wrote Adair on or around June 2, 1917, 
about his concerns for the calf crop, noting that 
“it is going to be rather short.” Problems with get-
ting water to the cattle had hurt the calf numbers. 
He added that “we are making strenuous efforts 
to secure at least another well right away on the 
plains in that pasture.” In order to save their 
cattle, JA employees would need to drill water 
wells on their property.33 If rain was not bound 
to come, cattle needed some other water source. 
And although many cattle died, some cattlemen 
were still willing to buy from the JA Ranch.
Unfortunately, little of the correspondence 
concerning the H. W. Skinner sale survives, 
but it is important for what it adds to this story. 
Skinner was a cattleman from Medicine Lodge, 
Kansas, in that state’s south-central region near 
the border with Oklahoma. He was looking to 
expand his small-scale cattle ranch, and the 
correspondence suggests—but does not explic-
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itly state—that he may have had some associa-
tion with Hobart in the past. In 1917, Skinner 
bought about 1,900 head. According to a letter 
from T. D. Hobart to Cornelia Adair from May 
1917, “he paid $5 per head on 1600 to be deliv-
ered September 1st [1917].” Hobart added that 
about “2000 head” comprised the sale, “although 
with a little more time we could easily have made 
up the number.” Hobart hoped that “a very good 
price” would be placed on the cattle, “especially 
in view of our conditions.” The Skinner purchase 
seemed to progress well amid all the problems the 
JA had had.34 In an October 1917 letter to Adair, 
Hobart trumpeted additional sales to Skinner. 
Comparable in size to the May purchase, “Old 
Cows” comprised slightly over half the sale. But 
about 150 calves were not part of the sale, with 
Hobart citing their condition as the reason: “too 
small not counted weak and very inferior.” On 
the other hand, close to as many calves were part 
of the sale. “The calves included in this delivery,” 
Hobart wrote, “include both steers and heifers 
following the old cows, many of the little calves 
thrown in were unbranded. [. . .] I understand 
Mr. Skinner lost twenty cows and four calves in 
shipping. We have to deliver the steer yearlings 
this week.” In all, Hobart sold over $52,000 in 
cattle.35 In spite of drought and blackleg, cattle 
sales did continue in some capacity.
Not surprisingly, the drought affected land 
sales. According to the Four Section Act of 1895, 
settlers could buy four sections of any combina-
tion of agricultural or pastoral lands for at least 
one dollar. But as Cornelia Adair wrote on July 
9, 1917, executing these land sales in accordance 
with this act was a difficult task to accomplish. A 
man named Payne was trying to buy some land 
around modern Tulia in Swisher County, some 
fifty miles south of Amarillo. Fifteen dollars 
per acre was the price set on some of the land. 
Adair believed this drought might be good for 
the JA Ranch. “I suppose,” Adair added, “this 
drought will block all land sales for the present. 
I only hope we are in for a succession of years 
of drought such as they had in Western Kansas 
years ago.”36 Of course, this wish would have un-
dermined the Land Law of 1887 and the Four 
Section Act of 1895, as mentioned earlier. Set-
tlers who would have had to continue paying on 
their land would have been further burdened by 
declining land values resulting from the drought. 
In particular, these land values would have fallen 
below the minimum threshold outlined by the 
Four Section Act.
This letter also seemed to contradict the wish 
that Cornelia Adair had professed to T. D. Ho-
bart earlier that year. As Adair aged, she suffered 
from neuritis. This and other health problems, 
as L. F. Sheffy later wrote, hindered her other-
wise energetic abilities.37 Therefore, she believed 
that her life may have been approaching its sun-
set. In March 1917 Adair wrote a private letter to 
T. D. Hobart explaining her wish to dispose of 
her lands. She gave Hobart three options for pro-
ceeding with the sale. “[T]ell me,” Adair wrote, 
“whether you think it would be best to offer the 
Ranch as a whole; to offer it divided into smaller 
ranches, say half a dozen; or to sell it in smaller 
tracts still, about the size of our present pastures 
like Sandy Pastures, Cherokee, &c.”38 Adair fa-
vored either of the latter two plans.39
Cornelia Adair knew that she did not have 
much time left to live, and she needed to dispose 
of her ranch immediately. If she did not, and if 
death came for her, then the ranch would likely 
be in dire financial straits. In response, Hobart 
wrote that the best plan of action was “to sell it 
in sub-divisions to people who would make a use 
of it,” adding that “suitable subdivisions with [a] 
minimum scale of prices” would help the sale 
of the JA Ranch. Hobart used his years with the 
“White Deer Lands [Company]” as a frame of ref-
erence. He added:
In selling out the ranch the cattle will of 
course have to be taken in consideration, it is 
a bad plan as a rule to sell the she [cattle] in 
that country, on the other hand it would not 
matter so much if you were going to close out 
the land and cattle might in many instances be 
included to advantage with the various sales 
of land.40
Some land sales, such as E. D. Harrell’s land pur-
chase in 1917–19, were successful both in process 
and in results, as compared to others such as the 
M. T. Howard boundary dispute. Payne’s attempt-
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ed purchase probably gravitated toward the latter. 
From the tone of Adair’s July 1917 letter, Payne 
might have been a land speculator, someone to 
whom Cornelia Adair did not want to sell her 
lands. So, in a way, Adair might have wanted a 
drought—at least for that reason. However, for 
other reasons, such as cattle sales, she wanted the 
drought to end.
Paradoxically, drought and cattle sicknesses 
probably had no immediate effect on the E. D. 
Harrell land purchase, because both Cornelia 
Adair and T. D. Hobart supported Harrell’s ef-
forts. A cattle rancher from Canyon, Texas, Har-
rell bought several sections of Palo Duro Canyon 
lands. Negotiations for this purchase, which in-
cluded possible oil-development rights, began in 
1917 and lasted for about two years. In fact, in-
sufficient funding, problems finding a business 
partner, and leadership’s problems with other 
land deals hurt Harrell’s efforts to buy 50,000 
to 60,000 acres in May 1917. The record does 
not say whether droughts and blackleg specifi-
cally affected Harrell, though they clearly affected 
his business partner, J. W. Puckett. An Amarillo 
resident who ran his own small-scale ranching op-
eration, Puckett joined the Harrell purchase so 
that he could start his own small-scale ranching 
operation farther to the southeast. Hobart wrote 
in January 1919 about Puckett’s progress amid 
winter storms. “800 choice cows,” he noted, “in 
the Northwest part of the Panhandle [had been 
stranded] in thirty inches of snow. . . . [H]e was 
trying to move these cattle to the Railroad so as 
to ship them south,” and he would have to pay 
$10,000 to save their lives. Because the range-
lands had lost large amounts of grass, he added, 
“it is going to take lots of money for extra feed as 
the winter is only fairly under way.”41 Although it 
killed many cattle, winter weather was a welcome 
relief in a drought because it helped grass grow 
back, if only for a little while. Also, the colder 
weather killed many of the insects, bugs, and 
bacteria that droughts enabled, giving the grass 
ample nourishment to grow. This weather often 
served as an antidote to blistering temperatures, 
not to mention the range fires that came with the 
drought.
AGRICULTURAL DEPRESSION
With the end of World War I came a darker pe-
riod in the JA Ranch’s history. Cornelia Adair, 
who had suffered from a variety of health prob-
lems as well as neuritis, died in September 1921. 
At her passing, she owed about three-quarters 
of a million dollars in taxes to Washington and 
London, and she owed slightly more in personal 
debts. Moreover, cattle and land prices began to 
fall significantly after World War I, creating an 
agricultural depression separate from the Great 
Depression a decade later. As executor of Corne-
lia Adair’s will, Hobart had to sell the JA Ranch. 
But the agriculture bust made it very difficult, if 
not impossible, to execute this sale. This prob-
lem, as B. Byron Price has found, lasted until 
Hobart’s death in 1935. After that, M. H. W. 
“Montie” Ritchie, a grandson of Cornelia Adair, 
took over ranch operations and was able to save 
the ranch from insolvency. For fifty-eight years, 
Ritchie oversaw better times for the JA Ranch. 
Ritchie died in 1999, six years after selling the 
JA Ranch to his daughter, Ninia Ritchie, and her 
business partner, Amarillo resident Jay O’Brien. 
They own the ranch to this day.42
Drought and blackleg had major consequenc-
es for the JA Ranch, as well as for many ranches. 
First, as mentioned earlier, an already thin layer 
of grass became even thinner, if not nonexistent. 
This grass depletion left ranchlands even more 
barren, setting the stage for the 1930s Dust Bowl. 
Heat and drought similar to the conditions on 
the JA Ranch in the mid-1910s compounded the 
problems. The newer generation of conservation-
ists, then, would say that they were right about 
cattle ranching. Second, although land and cattle 
prices remained higher during World War I, these 
price spikes were only temporary. A few years af-
ter World War I ended, cattle ranches, as well as 
the national economy as a whole, slipped into an 
economic depression. Although much of the na-
tion recovered quickly after this 1920–21 depres-
sion, agriculture was slow to recover—if it ever did 
during the 1920s. For agriculture, the arrival of 
the Great Depression made little difference; hard 
times never seemed to have left. Third, in order 
for cattle ranches to survive, they needed to diver-
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sify their business beyond farming and ranching. 
Some ranches, like the 6666 Ranch in Carson 
County, Texas, began attempts at producing oil 
around this time.43 The famed King Ranch, fur-
ther downstate near Texas’s Gulf Coast, did so as 
well. They even expanded into several nations.44 
Only the JA and the XIT Ranches did not pro-
duce oil or gas on their rangelands. Fourth, cattle 
needed to be able to survive drought, blackleg, or 
any other malady that came their way. Cowmen 
bred cattle from the time of their first ranches in 
Texas. For example, late in his life Charles Good-
night bred cattle with buffalo.45 Darwinism, in a 
sense, was at work: survival of the fittest applied 
to the cattle’s survival.46 Perhaps these cowmen 
thought that crossbred cattle would survive better 
than purebred cattle when it came to enduring 
various maladies. The correspondence says noth-
ing about Charles Goodnight’s cattalo, meaning 
that the crossbreeding of cattle and buffalo prob-
ably did not succeed. Unproductive lands and 
unhealthy cattle took their toll on ranchers. This 
toll further underscored the need to diversify 
these ranchers’ business practices.
It was likely that Cornelia Adair’s declining 
health had something to do with her wildly in-
consistent views on land sales. Drought and re-
lated cattle sickness had already done their dam-
age, and this stress resonates through some of her 
letters to Timothy Dwight Hobart. Those from 
March 1917 and the following July particularly 
reveal her ambivalence. Did she really want to 
sell the JA Ranch? Did she want to do so quickly? 
Also, an air of desperation in her old age seems 
to permeate this correspondence. Of course, cen-
soring mail was a common practice on the Brit-
ish Isles during World War I, and the knowledge 
that her mail was being read might have affected 
Adair’s consistency on this issue. During this 
time, she maintained residences in Great Britain 
and in Ireland. World War I had engulfed Eu-
rope. For wealthy British and Irish property own-
ers such as Cornelia Adair, the daily fear of losing 
property by any method placed even more stress 
on daily life. Dealing with that and with business 
losses caused by drought thousands of miles away 
must have adversely affected her health.
THE JA RANCH IN CONTEXT
The first anti-blackleg vaccinations on the JA 
Ranch coincided with American intervention in 
World War I. American troops needed beefsteak, 
and these ranches were ideal producers. The Kan-
sas State Agricultural College had developed this 
vaccine by 1917, just as President Woodrow Wil-
son had considered sending American troops to 
Europe. Even though the correspondence does 
not give the range scholar much insight into how 
the vaccine was developed, we know that it was 
developed in time to save a significant portion 
of the JA Ranch’s cattle. More broadly, it came 
in time to benefit American troops beginning to 
fight in Europe. However, for these ranches, the 
vaccine came too late to heal the self-inflicted fi-
nancial wounds, such as overspending.
It is unknown whether droughts and cattle 
sickness had a measurable effect on land and 
cattle sales already in progress, but they might 
have been behind the seemingly sudden and 
rapid changes in Adair’s position on land sales. If 
not for the rains that had fallen, for instance, in 
September 1916, the negative consequences for 
ranching, including for the JA Ranch, might have 
been more significant. Of particular note was 
the averted disaster that H. W. Skinner’s cattle 
purchase might have been. The vaccine used to 
combat blackleg was developed in Kansas, where 
Skinner resided during this time. It is possible 
that Skinner knew enough about the vaccine 
to know that the ranches using it on their cattle 
would be able to sell them more safely. However, 
there was an unforeseen variable that threatened 
to wreck Skinner’s purchase: the winter blizzards, 
a perfect antidote to drought. Overall, disaster 
was temporarily averted for JA cattle sales.
Much of the success in spite of and failure 
stemming from drought and blackleg occurred in 
the context of World War I. The conflict that the 
pre–World War II generation termed the “Great 
War” had a significant impact on the U.S. econ-
omy, including agribusiness. From fuel to food, 
Americans went to work so that their military 
could win a war in Europe. Paradoxically, a num-
ber of Americans did not know much about the 
real causes behind the war.47 Still, many Ameri-
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cans supported their military, win, lose, or draw. 
This patriotic spirit existed on the corporate 
ranches. Even amid cattle disease and drought, 
ranchers still needed to take their cattle market—
and sell it at the highest possible price. Soldiers 
needed food. Cowmen produced beefsteak, not 
to mention other crops. This supply-and-demand 
correlation increased cattle prices. On the other 
side of the coin, American civilians did not get 
this privilege. In fact, then-U.S. Food Department 
head Herbert Hoover encouraged Americans to 
go without meat for one day each week. While 
this abstinence helped ordinary Americans con-
serve meat and save money, even amid an increas-
ing standard of living, it also prevented cattle 
and land prices from further increasing. Thus, 
cowmen did not have the additional benefit of 
even higher cattle prices. Given the agricultural 
depression of the 1920s, extra revenue would have 
helped cowmen, giving them a safety net.
Another view comes from Connie Wood-
house, who argues that precipitation trended 
upward between the end of the Civil War–era 
drought and the Dust Bowl years, despite alter-
nating years of above-normal and below-normal 
precipitation.48 Thus, since the JA Ranch was 
experiencing drought even as precipitation levels 
generally increased following 1865, because there 
were inconsistencies in rainfall by location. That 
is, weather patterns most conducive to significant 
rainfall might have skirted the JA Ranch.
While the JA Ranch grew and then shrunk in 
land size, much of the West saw the conservation 
movement, which aimed to save the West’s natu-
ral resources, take shape. Although it was in the 
best interests of cattlemen to take care of the land, 
the practice of overgrazing had to have angered 
those concerned with the long-term impact on the 
environment. The 1930s drought that saw black 
dust clouds and hot temperatures punish the Pan-
handle for several years proved them right.
Finally, smaller farms and ranches eventu-
ally supplanted these corporate ranches, as men-
tioned earlier. The work of John Miller Morris 
addresses the impact of family farms on the 
Southern Plains. Before settlement exploded—
that is, while these corporate ranches grew their 
business and spent their businesses into near-
bankruptcy—Morris’s figure of “some thirty-five 
thousand . . . settlers . . . or so” seems accurate. 
“[R]ailroad corridor towns” and “county seat 
towns” held many of the settlers not on corpo-
rate ranch lands. Clarendon, Texas, one of the JA 
Ranch’s municipal strongholds, was part of the 
former group. But the start of the twentieth cen-
tury brought new settlers with no real knowledge 
of the area, putting pressure on established cow-
men in addition to the 1886–87 crisis. This ad-
ditional pressure from smaller-scale farmers and 
ranchers did not help matters.49
With improving food-preservation technolo-
gies, Americans could now buy more beef than 
in previous times. This increase in beef purchases 
helped cattle ranches across this region—but only 
if ranches sold healthy cattle at market. Sickened 
cattle could not be sold, thus temporarily increas-
ing cattle prices according to demand. But after 
World War I, Americans, including the soldiers 
who had helped win that war, did not purchase 
as much beef. Cattle prices, which had been in-
flated because of war demand and fewer healthy 
cattle, dropped dramatically, and cattle ranchers 
could not sell even their healthiest cattle. Rain-
fall, or lack thereof, helped or hurt ranching op-
erations, regardless of its scale.
CONCLUSION
In this article I have examined the effects of 
drought and blackleg on cattle sales and some land 
sales on the JA Ranch. The work has attempted to 
fill a gap in the historiography on western ranch-
ing by emphasizing the impact of drought other 
than the Big Die-Up of 1886–87. The timing of 
this article is perhaps serendipitous, as beginning 
in the second half of 2010, West Texas under-
went the worst drought in at least fifty years. It 
was a condition that Cornelia Adair and Timothy 
Dwight Hobart would recognize. No doubt their 
handling of it would be instructive for those of us 
who witnessed the recent drought.
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